In the current studies, we addressed the development of effort-based object valuation. Four-and 6-year-olds invested either great or little effort in order to obtain attractive or unattractive rewards. Children were allowed to allocate these rewards to an unfamiliar recipient (dictator game). Investing great effort to obtain attractive rewards (a consonant situation) led 6-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, to enhance the value of the rewards and thus distribute fewer of them to others. After investing effort to attain unattractive rewards (a dissonant situation), 6-year-olds cognitively reduced the dissonance between effort and reward quality by reappraising the value of the rewards and thus distributing fewer of them. In contrast, 4-year-olds reduced the dissonance behaviorally by discarding the rewards. These findings provide evidence for the emergence of an effort-value link and underline possible mechanisms underlying the primacy of cognitive versus behavioral solutions to dissonance reduction.
Research Article
People typically value objects because of their intrinsic properties (e.g., functionality, beauty). However, attributions of value are also affected by the personal effort invested in obtaining objects (Bloom, 2010; Higgins, 2007) . Such effects occur primarily in two types of situations, each encompassing different patterns of effortreward relations (Aronson, 1969; Higgins, 2006) . When effort leads to the attainment of a desirable reward (a consonant relation), the effort is aligned with the motivational incentive to attain the reward, and eventually leads people to appreciate the reward more than if it had been attained effortlessly (Higgins, 2006; Higgins & Scholer, 2009; Labroo & Kim, 2009 ). The second, more intriguing situation, is one in which the investment of effort leads to the attainment of undesirable rewards. This creates a dissonance between the effort invested and the reward attained, a dissonance that has been elaborated on by Festinger (1957) , in general, and Aronson and Mills (1959) , specifically, in the realm of "effort justification." The goal of the present studies was twofold: first, to assess the development of effort-based object valuations, evident in consonant situations, and second, to shed light on possible mechanisms underlying dissonance reduction.
In Aronson and Mills's (1959) classic effort-justification paradigm, participants underwent a severe, mild, or noinitiation procedure in order to join an unexpectedly dull discussion group. The main finding was that the participants who reported most enjoying the discussion were ones who had undergone the severe initiation. Following cognitive-dissonance theory, this was interpreted in terms of the presumed psychological discomfort caused by holding conflicting cognitions and behaviors, and the consequent motivation to reduce the discomfort by any available means. Specifically, participants who underwent the severe initiation likely were the most compelled to justify their seemingly unreasonable effort by boosting the value of the dull "reward" post hoc.
589585P SSXXX10.1177 Inherent in this account is a premise that the discomfort is best combatted via cognitive means (i.e., reappraisal of value). For example, Festinger (1957) described how smokers may be aware of the unhealthy effects of cigarettes yet justify continuing to smoke by either altering their beliefs about the negative effects of smoking (e.g., "the health risk is minor") or emphasizing its positive effects (e.g., "smoking reduces tension"). Compatibly emphasizing the primacy of cognitive means, recent approaches suggest that dissonance may derive from a perceived threat to one's self-concept (Cooper, 2007; Steele, 1988) or the unbearable sense of cognitive inconsistency (Gawronski, 2012) ; thus, these approaches suggest that the most effective solutions are to alter new concepts or change existing ones. Crucially, this privileging of a cognitive solution for dissonance reduction is only an optional one. As Festinger noted, a second solution is to adjust one's behavior to match one's cognition, for example, by removing the source of the discomforting feeling ("stop smoking!"; see also Cooper, 2007) . This behavioral solution is rarely entertained.
One possible reason for this neglect is that adults are quite proficient at altering cognitions and can thus easily re-represent the value of a reward (Gibbons, Eggleston, & Benthin, 1997) . A second, complementary reason is that adults often develop a sense of ownership in regard to objects obtained via effort. As Belk (1988) pointed out, "We own ourselves . . . therefore we own our labor . . . therefore we own what we produce from our labor" (p. 144). The consequent "endowment effect" (Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2009 ) makes it easier to reappraise an object's perceived value than to detach oneself from it. In sum, adults' proficiency at switching cognitions about the value of objects, and their reluctance to detach from owned objects, may have made reappraisal the preferable strategy for reducing dissonance. Here, we indirectly tested this conjecture, by assessing a population in which the above mechanisms are less maturenamely, preschool children.
Some of the processes involved in the evaluation of objects are manifest among preschoolers, such as the endowment effect (Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012) and the effect of invested effort on children's sense of ownership (Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, & Hood, 2010) , sharing (Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011) , and preferences (Li, Shaw, & Olson, 2013) . However, there have been only a handful of studies assessing cognitive dissonance among young children (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1963; Egan, Santos, & Bloom, 2007) , and none employed an effort-justification paradigm nor allowed children the option to reduce dissonance via either cognitive or behavioral adjustments. Notably, developmental changes in the preschool years may suggest that relying on cognitive or behavioral solutions may not be equally amenable for 4-and 6-year-olds.
From a strictly cognitive perspective, reducing a dissonant arousal arguably involves self-regulatory and representational capacities (Amodio, Master, Yee, & Taylor, 2008) . Specifically, it requires the capacity to inhibit an immediate behavioral response and make a representational shift (C. Harmon-Jones, Schmeichel, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2011). These capacities undergo substantial changes between the ages of 4 to 6 years, and this is particularly true of inhibitory functions (Best & Miller, 2010) , the capacity to hold alternative representations (Decety, 2010; Sabbagh, Bowman, Evraire, & Ito, 2009; Wellman, 2014) , and the ability to redescribe representations (Karmiloff-Smith, 1990) . Thus, to the extent that these capacities are involved in effort-based object valuation, it should be easier for 6-than for 4-year-olds to reappraise the value of a reward obtained via effort, both in consonant and dissonant situations.
A similar developmental prediction stems from the literature about the development of a self-concept. Specifically, although preschoolers value their own possessions (Gelman et al., 2012; Hood & Bloom, 2008) and view possessions as an "extension of the self" (Diesendruck & Perez, 2015 ; see also Fasig, 2000) , they are less capable (and thus have a lesser need) of preserving a coherent and well-integrated self-concept than older children and adults (Harter, 2012) . Thus, when dissonance occurs, we suspect that 4-year-olds will be less motivated than 6-year-olds to justify their past behavior.
In the present study, children completed an effortful or effortless task in order to obtain attractive or unattractive stickers. Then, children participated in a resourcedistribution task, in which they were asked to decide how many of the obtained stickers they wanted to distribute to an unfamiliar recipient. Our first question regarded children's ability to transform effort into value in consonant situations (i.e., when effort leads to attractive rewards). We predicted that such cognitive maneuvering would be seen more decisively among 6-than 4-year-olds. The second critical question revolved around children's decisions in dissonant situations (i.e., when effort leads to unattractive rewards). Our logic here was similar to the one described by Aronson and Mills (1959) and has been extensively used in comparative work (Zentall, 2010) . Namely, we reasoned that children's solution to a potential dissonance would be manifested in their appreciation of the rewards, specifically, in how many stickers children were willing to forego. Thus, in that situation, would children "justify" their effort by reappraising-and enhancing-the value of the unattractive stickers they now possessed (thus distributing less)? Or would children adjust their behavior to reduce the dissonance, that is, discard the discomfort-producing stickers (thus distributing more)? Given the developmental differences described previously, we predicted that 6-year-olds would be more likely to reappraise rewards and 4-year-olds would be more likely to discard them.
Study 1

Method
Participants. Ninety-eight 3-to 6-year-olds participated in the study: forty-five 3-to 4-year-olds (the 4-yearolds group; M = 4.2, SD = 5 months; 42% girls, 58% boys) and fifty-three 5-to 6-year-olds (the 6-year-olds group; M = 5.9, SD = 5.5 months; 58% girls, 42% boys). The younger children were recruited from two prekindergartens and the older children from two kindergartens, all in the same Israeli city. Participants were from a background of average socioeconomic status, and all parents had signed permission for their children to participate. Eight children were excluded because of various misunderstandings or lack of interest in the task.
Materials. Sixteen different types of similarly sized and shaped stickers were evaluated in a pretest with a different sample of 64 children (53% 4-year-olds, 47% 6-yearolds; 53% girls, 47% boys). The highest-and the lowest-ranked types of stickers from the pretest were used to represent highly attractive and highly unattractive resources for each age group and gender. In Study 1, four sets of stickers were used for each one of the gender and age subgroups: two sets of attractive stickers and two sets of unattractive stickers. For example, 6-year-old boys found Dragon Ball and SpongeBob stickers the most attractive and Disney princesses and plants stickers the most unattractive. Each set consisted of 10 stickers of the same type (e.g., 10 different Dragon Ball figures or 10 different SpongeBob figures), and every child played only with one set of attractive stickers and one set of unattractive stickers (determined randomly).
Design. The study had a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed design, with age group (4-and 6-year-olds) and invested effort (effortful, effortless) as between-participants variables and stickers' attractiveness (attractive, unattractive) as a within-participants variable. The order of playing with the kinds of stickers was counterbalanced across participants.
Procedure. The experimenter sat individually with each child. To confirm the pretest results, the experimenter presented two stickers to the child, one exemplar from the attractive set and one from the unattractive set, and asked the child, "which sticker do you like more?"; 99% of the selections matched the pretest results. The experimenter then presented the stickers game (i.e., a childfriendly dictator game).
In the first phase of the game, children were told that they could earn stickers by performing some tasks. The type of tasks varied according to the effort condition to which children were randomly assigned: effortful or effortless. Crucially, children did not know the type of stickers (attractive or unattractive) they would be getting after each task, how many tasks they would be asked to perform, how many stickers they would get, and whether the reward type would remain the same for all tasks.
In the effortful condition, children were told that in order to gain stickers, they had to close their eyes and count as high as they could. They were then asked by the experimenter to count five more above the number at which they had stopped. After doing so, they were given two stickers. Then, children were told that in order to gain more stickers, they should close their eyes and recite the alphabet as far as they could. After they finished, they were asked to recite five more letters, for which they were given three additional stickers. Similarly, two additional tasks included counting backward (two more stickers gained) and reciting the alphabet backward (three more stickers). In contrast, in the effortless condition, children accumulated stickers by answering four trivial questions, such as, "How old are you?" (two stickers) and "What is the name of your teacher?" (three more stickers).
In both conditions, in order to avoid prompting feelings of success or failure, the experimenter did not provide any complimentary feedback (e.g., "good") and instead simply said "OK" to children's responses. Eventually, all children in both conditions accumulated 10 different stickers of the same type (e.g., 10 different Dragon Ball stickers). Notably, it took children about 1 min to obtain 10 stickers in the effortless condition and around 10 min to do so in the effortful condition-a difference that enhanced the effort manipulation. After children had accumulated 10 stickers, the experimenter counted the stickers with the child and then moved to the second and main phase of the stickers game (the dictator game).
For this phase, the experimenter presented a video displaying an unfamiliar age-and gender-matched recipient (e.g., "Ron" for boys and "Rotem" for girls) and told children that "in the stickers game, you can decide how many to give to Ron/Rotem and how many to keep for yourself. You decide, and then later I will take the stickers to Ron/Rotem." The experimenter emphasized that every possible allocation was legitimate by saying that, "you can give zero, one, two, three, four . . . ten." Two rounds of the game were played, each with either a set of attractive stickers or a set of unattractive ones (order counterbalanced). Each round was played in front of a new unfamiliar recipient ("Nadav" for boys and "Maayan" for girls), and children were not told that there would be two rounds in the game. After each round, the experimenter told children that he would keep the unallocated stickers for them, placing the stickers in an envelope marked with the child's name. The dependent measure was the number of stickers children offered to the recipient.
Results
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with attractiveness as the repeated factor and effort condition and age group as between-participants variables. The analysis revealed a main effect of attractiveness, F(1, 94) = 33.58, p < .001, η 2 = .263. Replicating previous findings (Blake & Rand, 2010) , results here showed that children overall distributed fewer attractive (M = 17.3%, SD = 14%) than unattractive stickers (M = 26.7%, SD = 17.4%), a pattern found robustly among both 6-year-olds, F(1, 51) = 17.37, p < .001, η 2 = .254, and 4-year-olds, F(1, 43) = 15.98, p < .001, η 2 = .271. This main effect confirms that 4-year-olds understood the basic premise of the dictator game. Moreover, the analysis also revealed a two-way interaction between effort condition and age group, F(1, 94) = 8.86, p < .01, η 2 = .086, and a three-way interaction among attractiveness, effort condition, and age group, F(1, 90) = 4.02, p < .05, η 2 = .048 (Fig. 1) . (Analyses including the order of the rewards-attractive in Trial 1 and unattractive in Trial 2 or vice versa-as a factor yielded the same results.)
We followed-up on the three-way interaction by conducting a multivariate ANOVA using the distribution rate of attractive and unattractive stickers as dependent variables and age group and effort condition as betweenparticipants variables. The analysis revealed two disordinal two-way interactions between age group and effort condition for distributing both attractive stickers, F(1, 94) = 4.86, p < .05, η 2 = .05, and unattractive ones, F(1, 94) = 9.06, p ≤ .01, η 2 = .09.
Follow-up analyses on these two-way interactions revealed that when 4-year-olds distributed attractive stickers, effort did not affect their distribution rates (M = 20%, SD = 16.3%; M = 19.1%, SD = 10.8%, for the effortful and effortless conditions, respectively), but effort did affect 6-year-olds distribution rates, t(51) = 3.1, p = .001 (one-tailed), Cohen's d = 0.87. As can be seen in Figure  1a , 6-year-olds distributed 54% fewer stickers in the effortful condition (M = 9.6%, SD = 12.1%) than in the effortless condition (M = 20.7%, SD = 13.9%).
When participants distributed unattractive stickers, main effects of effort condition were found among both 6-year-olds, t(51) = 2.5, p < .01 (one-tailed), Cohen's d = 0.7, and 4-year-olds, t(27.7) = 1.74, p < .05 (one-tailed), Cohen's d = 0.66, but the effects were in opposite directions (Fig. 1b) . Specifically, 6-year-olds behaved in the same manner as when distributing attractive stickers, distributing fewer unattractive stickers in the effortful condition (M = 16.8%, SD = 17.7%) than the effortless condition (M = 30.4%, SD = 20.6%), a decrement of 45%. However, 4-year-olds behaved in a qualitatively different way. Specifically, they distributed significantly more unattractive stickers in the effortful condition (M = 36%, SD = 28.9%) than in the effortless condition (M = 24.3%, SD = 12%), which represents a 48% increase in distribution rate. 
Summary
The findings supported our hypotheses about the development of effort-based object valuations. First, when effort led to attractive rewards (a consonant situation), 6-but not 4-year-olds translated effort into value, distributing more than 50% fewer stickers after effort than after no effort. Second, when effort led to unattractive rewards (a dissonant situation), 6-year-olds distributed almost 50% fewer stickers than their peers who expended no effort, consistent with a reappraisal of the rewards' value.
In contrast, 4-year-olds distributed almost 50% more stickers when effort led to unattractive rewards, which suggests a behavioral solution to the dissonant situation. This disordinal interaction regarding the percentage of distributions also helps minimize a general limitation of distributive tasks; namely, that the distributive context itself might prompt participants to give something. Evidently, this potential effect of task demands cannot fully account for the noted interaction, but it encourages us to be cautious in interpreting children's behavior in absolute terms. An alternative explanation for 4-year-olds' behavior in the effortful condition is that, like 6-year-olds, they too enhanced the value of the unattractive rewards. However, whereas 6-year-olds acted on this appreciation egotistically, thus keeping these valuable resources to themselves, 4-year-olds acted altruistically, offering the stickers to someone else. A second, related interpretation is that, unlike 6-year-olds, 4-year-olds found the effortful tasks gratifying, thus getting a boost in their mood that increased their generosity. A third interpretation is that whereas 6-year-olds decided to give away fewer stickers in the effortful than in the effortless condition because they felt more deserving than someone whose effort was not defined, 4-year-olds were less capable of engaging in such equity-based reasoning.
To address these alternatives, we conducted a second study. According to our original account, 4-year-olds' behavior derived primarily from their own desire to distance themselves from the source of the discomfortgenerating reward. In other words, children's decisions were unprejudiced by who the recipient was. In contrast, according to the three alternative interpretations, 4-year-olds' behavior derived from a distinct consideration of the potential recipient, in terms of altruism, generosity, or equity. It thus follows that 4-year-olds would be expected to behave differently if no potential recipient were clearly marked and identified. We tested this prediction in Study 2 by asking children to decide how many stickers to discard into a box instead of distribute to an unfamiliar child recipient, as was done in Study 1.
Study 2
Method
Study 2 was nearly identical to Study 1. A new sample of twenty-four 4-year-old children (M = 4.25, SD = 6 months; 33% girls, 67% boys) played in the effortful condition, with attractive and unattractive stickers as a withinparticipants variable. In Study 2, the "recipient" was a box (presented in a video) rather than another child. In other words, participants were never introduced to another child in Study 2, nor were they told that distributed stickers would be given to another child (e.g., children were told, "you can decide how many to give to the box, and how many to keep for yourself"). Children were from a similar background and were recruited in a similar manner as those tested in Study 1.
Results
The main test was a direct comparison of the responses of 4-year-olds in Study 2 with those of 4-year-olds in the effortful condition of Study 1. A repeated measures ANOVA with recipient (child, box) as a between-participants variable and sticker attractiveness (attractive, unattractive) as a within-participants variable revealed neither a main effect of recipient, F(1, 44) = 0.76, p > .25, nor an interaction between recipient and sticker attractiveness, F(1, 44) = 0.2, p > .25. In other words, 4-year-olds distributed a similar number of stickers to a box (M = 33.1%, SD = 19.5%) as they did to a child (M = 28%, SD = 20.7%), which indicates that children's distributive choice did not derive from other-focused considerations.
The only main effect found in the ANOVA was of sticker attractiveness, F(1, 44) = 18.22, p < .001, η 2 = .293; the distribution rate of attractive stickers (M = 23.5%, SD = 16.8%) was lower than that of unattractive ones (M = 37.8%, SD = 27.9%; Fig. 2 ). Indeed, a paired samples t test comparing the number of attractive and unattractive stickers distributed only in Study 2 revealed a significant difference, t(24) = 2.69, p < .01 (one-tailed), Cohen's d = 0.55. Children discarded more unattractive (M = 39.6%, SD = 27.4%) than attractive stickers (M = 26.7%, SD = 16.9%), similar to the difference in Study 1.
General Discussion
The goal of the present studies was to assess how children's object valuation is affected when effort leads to either attractive or unattractive rewards. The former, consonant situations are ones in which effort has been found to serve as a motivational incentive, thus adding value to obtained objects (Higgins, 2006) . Here, we found that effort seems to serve a similar function for 6-but not 4-year-olds. The latter distributed as many attractive stickers after obtaining them effortfully as when obtaining them effortlessly. Previous studies have found that 4-yearolds link effort and ownership in third-party judgments (Kanngiesser et al., 2010) and in collaboration with peers (Warneken et al., 2011) . The present findings thus suggest that, compared with 6-year-olds, 4-year-olds' apparent lack of revaluation of objects obtained effortfully derived specifically from a weaker attachment to their property. Future examinations may directly attempt to disentangle the relations between effort, possession, selfconcept, and subjective value.
Dissonant situations-in which effort leads to unattractive rewards-allowed us to assess variations in the possible solutions typically deployed in effort-justification paradigms. First, our findings concur with those of Aronson and Carlsmith's (1963) on induced compliance and those of Egan and colleagues (Egan, Bloom, & Santos, 2010; Egan et al., 2007) on free choice and show that also in an effort-justification paradigm, cognitive dissonance is experienced already by 4 years of age. Second, and theoretically more critically, our findings provide cues regarding the mechanisms underlying the resolution of dissonance and highlight that cognitive factors may not be necessary for such a process. In particular, whereas 6-year-olds reduced dissonance by reappraising and appreciating the value of the obtained rewards (a cognitive solution), 4-year-olds chose to distance themselves from the source of the dissonance (a behavioral solution), even when such distancing meant simply discarding the rewards into a box.
As Aronson (1973) pointed out, adults are highly proficient rationalizers, capable and interested in appearing reasonable to themselves and to others. Arguably, it is this capacity that adults commonly recruit to amend the threats to their self-concept (Steele, 1988) or to cognitive consistency (Gawronski, 2012; Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Harmon-Jones, 2009 ) experienced when engaging in seemingly irrational behavior, such as when working hard to achieve insignificant rewards. This mental-health benefit notwithstanding, it is often the case that the preferable solution to such dissonant situations is to alter behavior (e.g., stop smoking). In this regard, 4-year-olds' lesser committal to preserving a coherent sense of self and its extensions (Egan et al., 2010; Harter, 2012) , and their greater difficulty in recurring to cognitive maneuvers of value representations (Best & Miller, 2010; Wellman, 2014) , may have served them-and may possibly serve adults-well.
It will be important for future research with adults to address the role of these mechanisms directly. Such research will have to take into consideration how adults' dissonance solution is affected by myriad characteristics of dissonant situations, their interaction with individual dispositions, and the different types of cognitive justifications available (E. Harmon-Jones et al., 2009; Stone & Cooper, 2001) . One obvious methodological recommendation stemming from the present findings, nonetheless, is to design studies in which both cognitive and behavioral solutions are equally available. Ultimately, psychologists may devise a detailed and coherent model of the circumstances in which post hoc justification is preferred over detachment from an outcome, but importantly also, in which detachment is preferred over justification.
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